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Grocery shopping has become a foraging expedition through a market of lies. The coolers are stocked with milk cartons boasting pastoral scenes of cows grazing 
on verdant hills. Egg cartons are stamped “all-natural.” Sausage 
is neatly packaged in a tube and emblazoned with a red barn. 
But the origins of most meat and dairy products are far divorced 
from these depictions of traditional farming. In stark contrast, 
animal products are overwhelmingly produced in Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs),1 otherwise known as 
“factory farms.”2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines 
CAFOs as particular types of Animal Feeding Operations 
(AFOs).3 AFOs are facilities where animals are confined together 
in a small area, along with “feed, manure and urine, dead ani-
mals, and production operations.”4 In AFOs, food is brought to 
the animals rather than the animals grazing in pastures.5 AFOs 
are designated as CAFOs under two circumstances: (1) where 
the AFO is a “significant contributor of pollutants to waters of 
the United States,”6 or (2) where the AFO “stables or confines” a 
minimum number of animals.7
Today, about ten billion animals are raised and slaughtered in 
the United States every year.8 More than 99% of those animals are 
raised and slaughtered in CAFOs.9 American meat consumption 
has nearly doubled over the last century,10 and the USDA projects 
this consumption will further swell over the next decade.11 With 
this level of consumption, it comes as no surprise that animal 
products are cheap. Meat and dairy prices have been steadily 
dropping in the United States for over a century, in part due to the 
advent of CAFOs in the 1950s.12 But while the price Americans 
pay for animal products at the grocery store may seem low in dol-
lars, the true price is staggeringly high.
CAFOs are deleterious to human and nonhuman animals 
alike. In addition to causing unquantifiable animal suffering,13 
CAFOs put independent family farmers out of business,14 and 
they create deplorable working conditions for employees.15 
CAFOs also create massive externalities in the form of environ-
mental destruction while they ravage their vulnerable host com-
munities and trample civil rights.16 Section II examines some 
of these communities, located on the North Carolina Coastal 
Plain, which are home to many African American, Latino, 
Native American, and economically disadvantaged people.17 
This Section also describes the significant environmental dam-
age that CAFOs deal to these vulnerable communities, which in 
turn causes plummeting property values and endangers health.18 
Section III explores relevant law and how it fails to protect these 
vulnerable communities, creating the enforcement gap.19 Section 
IV explains how the idea of farming is America’s sacred cow, 
spurred by rosy visions of wholesome white farmers and their 
families living out the rugged individualism that our country has 
worshipped for centuries. Big Agribusiness (“Big Ag”)20 eagerly 
and effectively exploits this idea, raking in immense profit 
(including subsidies from misinformed tax payers) and power.21 
With this power, Big Ag purchases politicians. Those politicians 
twist the law into an instrument of oppression by carving out the 
enforcement gap. The enforcement gap invites CAFOs to exploit 
vulnerable communities. Section V reckons that North Carolina 
presents a potential blueprint for the way forward.22 Though fed-
eral environmental and civil rights laws face further weakening 
(and perhaps even extinction) under the Trump administration 
and a Republican-controlled Congress, these vulnerable com-
munities in North Carolina can fight CAFOs at the state level.
II. north carolIna: a case study  
In how caFos Plague Vulnerable 
communItIes oF color
The “Black Belt,” a “crescent-shaped band throughout the 
South where slaves worked on plantations,” runs squarely through 
eastern North Carolina.23 This part of the country has historically 
been defined as those places with a “black population majority at 
the time of the Civil War.”24 After the Civil War and emancipation, 
many African Americans remained in the Black Belt and worked 
as sharecroppers and tenant farmers.25 But African American 
farmers in the Black Belt were systematically deprived of farm-
land, largely due to discrimination in land sales and lending:
By the turn of the century, many of the black farm 
operators in the South managed to acquire farmland. 
Thereafter, however, black farm ownership and control 
of land, and other resources such as capital, have been 
severely limited due to systematic discrimination in land 
sales and farm credit, reported in both historical and 
contemporary sources. This was particularly the case in 
the lack of access to credit . . . from the [Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA)] which was established in the 
1930s to service the credit needs of farmers who failed to 
meet the lending criteria of other lending institutions.26
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Today, the communities in the Black Belt suffer from 
economic oppression in the form of high unemployment and 
poverty, low levels of education, low quality healthcare, and 
substandard housing.27 CAFOs descended on these vulner-
able communities like a plague, beginning in the mid-1980s.28 
Because communities of color and low-income communities 
often lack the political power of affluent white communities, 
CAFOs disproportionately occupy them.29 Indeed, the propor-
tion of African American, Hispanic, and Native American peo-
ple living within three miles of a North Carolina pig CAFO are 
1.54, 1.39, and 2.18 times higher, respectively.30 Communities 
of color and low-income communities also lack the resources to 
leave compromised areas, where they are trapped by decreasing 
property values and a plummeting quality of life.31
There are 9.5 million pigs in North Carolina—the other vic-
tims of the state’s $3 billion pork industry.32 The pigs are spread 
across approximately 2,100 different operations33 and produce a 
total of ten billion gallons of waste each year, which is “enough 
to fill more than 15,000 Olympic-size swimming pools.”34 The 
pigs are confined to large indoor facilities with slatted floors,35 
and their waste is pumped outdoors to what the pork industry 
calls a “lagoon.” Lagoons are vast open-air cesspools filled with 
untreated manure, urine, and afterbirth.36 Some lagoons are as 
large as seven-and-a-half acres and hold 20 to 45 million gal-
lons of waste.37 There are more than 4,000 lagoons in North 
Carolina.38 These lagoons “have broken, failed, or overflowed, 
leading to major fish kills and other pollution incidents.”39 When 
the lagoons become full, CAFO operators manage volume by 
spraying the waste through sprinkler systems onto “sprayfields” 
in large quantities.40 “Operators have sprayed waste in windy 
and wet weather, on frozen ground, or on land already saturated 
with manure,” causing runoff and leaks into aquifers.41
This waste management system fails to protect surrounding 
communities from the environmental impacts of the industry. 
Instead, CAFOs heap further injustice on surrounding North 
Carolina communities by polluting their water and air, harming 
their health, and depressing their property values.
a. polluteD water
CAFOs pollute surface water and groundwater in several 
different ways, including lagoon breaches, catastrophic flood-
ing, and runoff.42 Potential contaminants include nitrates and 
pathogens43 as well as ammonium, phosphate, dissolved solids, 
metals and metalloids, pharmaceutical chemicals, and natural 
and synthetic hormones.44 “Pathogens are parasites, bacterium, 
or viruses that are capable of causing disease or infection in ani-
mals or humans . . . . There are over 150 pathogens in manure that 
could impact human health.”45 Metals and metalloids include 
copper, zinc, arsenic, nickel, and selenium.46 Pharmaceutical 
chemicals include antibiotics, and hormones include estrogen.47
The consequences of lagoon breaches are severe, endan-
gering the water supply and aquatic life. In 1995, an eight-acre 
lagoon breached and spilled “25 million gallons of animal waste 
into the New River. The spill killed 10 million fish and closed 
364,000 acres of coastal wetlands to shellfishing.”48 Lagoon 
compromises are more likely during hurricane season. Hurricane 
Floyd pummeled the North Carolina coast in 1999 and compro-
mised fifty-two lagoons, releasing uncontrolled waste into the 
floodwaters.49 “Sampling conducted after Hurricane Floyd in 
1999 found dangerous levels of E. Coli and Clostridium perfrin-
gens in water, even after floodwaters had receded.”50 In 2016, 
it happened again. Hurricane Matthew dumped eighteen inches 
of rain on the North Carolina Coastal Plain, causing flooding so 
extensive that it was visible from space.51 “[T]he flood partially 
submerged [ten] industrial pig farms with [thirty-nine] barns . . . 
and [fourteen] open-air pits holding millions of gallons of liquid 
hog manure.”52 Once more, uncontrolled waste flowed freely 
from lagoons into the floodwaters. Sprayfields saturated with 
lagoon waste are also submerged following such major flooding 
events.53
Even during normal weather conditions, sprayfield runoff 
threatens North Carolina lakes, rivers, streams, other surface 
waters, and groundwater.54 Indeed, “[t]he agriculture sector, 
including CAFOs, is the leading contributor of pollutants to 
lakes, rivers, and reservoirs. It has been found that states with 
high concentrations of CAFOs experience on average [twenty] 
to [thirty] serious water quality problems per year as a result of 
manure management problems.”55 These contaminations cause 
loss of aquatic life and invade the water supply.56 Lagoons and 
sprayfields also compromise groundwater on a regular basis.57
Contaminants can enter ground water from a variety 
of CAFO sources, including leaking lagoons, breaches 
in piping or barn infrastructure, and land application 
of liquid and solid wastes. There are guidelines for 
design and construction of barns, infrastructure piping, 
and lagoons that in theory would preclude leakage to 
ground water, but in practice these events do occur. 
In fact, even when properly constructed, slow leakage 
from lagoons over time can release large amounts of 
contaminants such as ammonium.58
Contaminated groundwater leads to contaminated drinking 
water in rural areas like the Black Belt.59 Indeed, rural populations 
have elevated rates of reliance upon wells for drinking water.60 
Nonetheless, in this area of North Carolina, “[m]ost hog opera-
tions . . . are located in areas with high dependence on well-water 
for drinking.”61 Those that do rely on wells for drinking water are 
at higher risk for water contamination because the Black Belt is 
located on the North Carolina Coastal Plain, which has high water 
tables and wells that are unlined and shallow.62 For these reasons, 
some residents have stopped using their wells.63
The health impacts of polluted water are serious, particularly 
for those community members who have weakened immune 
systems. Symptoms of illnesses caused by contaminated water 
include “nausea, vomiting, fever, diarrhea, muscle pain, death,” 
and kidney failure.64 People at high risk of illness or death con-
stitute approximately 20% of the United States population, and 
they include the elderly, infants, young children, and those who 
are pregnant, HIV positive, on chemotherapy, or are otherwise 
immunosuppressed.65
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In addition to pathogen-driven illnesses, there is also the 
threat of new viruses.66 Indeed, there is speculation that H1N1 
may have spawned in pig CAFOs in Mexico.67 But despite this 
risk, CAFOs are not required to test for new viruses because 
they are not on the list of mandatory reportable illnesses to the 
World Organization for Animal Health.68
Finally, there are often antibiotics in CAFOs’ animal feed.69 
Seventy percent of all antibiotics used in the United States are 
administered to animals as additives in their feed.70 The goal 
of administering these antibiotics is to promote animal growth, 
and therefore profitability.71 The Center for Disease Control has 
recommended that the use of antibiotics in “food animals” be 
“phased out.”72 These antibiotics are dangerous because “[t]he 
antibiotics often are not fully metabolized by animals, and can 
be present in their manure. If manure pollutes a water supply, 
antibiotics can also leech into groundwater or surface water.”73 
The risk to the community is high because this exposure causes 
antibiotics to be less effective for humans while also leading to 
the development of antibiotic-resistant microbes.74
b. polluteD air
CAFOs produce emissions that fuel climate change75 
and diminish ambient air quality.76 Indeed, between the ani-
mals themselves and the degrading waste in lagoons and on 
sprayfields, CAFOs cause asthma, acid rain, and climate change 
by releasing the following into the air: 400 volatile organic com-
pounds (VOC), particulate matter, methane, ammonia, hydrogen 
sulfide, ozone, endotoxins, and noxious odors.77 CAFOs pro-
duce nearly 75% of the United States’ ammonia air pollution.78
These emissions are so concentrated that it can be danger-
ous even to approach a lagoon—particularly in hot summer 
months.79 “The oxygen-deficient, toxic, and/or explosive atmo-
sphere which can develop in a manure pit has claimed many 
lives.”80 There are multiple tales of farm workers who entered 
lagoons to make repairs and succumbed to the emissions. Some 
died from hydrogen sulfide poisoning, while others asphyxiated 
in the oxygen-starved air.81 Others died after collapsing during 
rescue attempts.82
But it is not necessary to be near a lagoon to suffer from 
the emissions—members of communities plagued by CAFOs 
also carry health risks. One study showed that people in CAFO-
occupied communities “suffered disproportionate levels of ten-
sion, anger, confusion, fatigue, depression, and lack of overall 
vigor as well as more upper respiratory and gastrointestinal ail-
ments than neighbors of other types of farms and non-livestock 
areas.”83 Ammonia is a “strong respiratory irritant” that causes 
chemical burns to the respiratory tract, skin, and eyes.84 It also 
causes severe coughing and chronic lung disease.85 Hydrogen 
sulfide is acutely dangerous, causing “inflammation of the moist 
membranes” in the eyes and respiratory tract as well as olfactory 
neuron loss, pulmonary edema, and even death.86 Particulate 
matter causes “chronic bronchitis, chronic respiratory symptoms, 
declines in lung function, [and] organic dust toxic syndrome.”87
Some of the most vulnerable individuals in these commu-
nities are children. “Children are known to be more vulnerable 
to the adverse health effects of air pollution due to their higher 
minute ventilation, immature immune system, involvement in 
vigorous activities, the longer periods of time they spend out-
doors, and the continuing development of their lungs during the 
postneonatal period.”88 Twenty-six percent of schools surveyed 
in North Carolina reported that CAFO odors are noticeable 
outside the school, and 8% reported that the odors were notice-
able inside the school.89 Economically disadvantaged children 
are more likely to suffer health impacts from CAFOs, including 
asthma, because those children are more likely to live and attend 
schools in closer proximity to CAFOs.90
c. plummeting property valueS
There is evidence that CAFOs adversely affect property 
values. “The most certain fact regarding CAFOs and property 
values are that the closer a property is to a CAFO, the more likely 
it will be that the value of the property will drop.”91 This decline 
is due in part to the health risks that CAFOs bring to communi-
ties, but it is also due to the tremendous nuisances that CAFOs 
create: odors from pig CAFOs, “reminiscent of rotten eggs and 
ammonia,” are insufferable.92 “My family, neighbors, and I have 
been held prisoner in our own homes by the unbearable stench 
from the multiple industrial hog operations within a quarter mile 
of my community.”93 Many community members no longer hang 
laundry outside on clotheslines to dry for fear that their cloth-
ing will be ruined by the fine mist of manure that sprinkles their 
homes and cars.94 Swarms of flies and mosquitos—attracted to the 
prolific waste in communities plagued by CAFOs—accompany 
the odor, bringing even further risk of disease.95
The degree to which CAFOs harm property values varies 
depending on several factors. One study found that properties 
within three miles of a CAFO decreased in value by 6.6% on 
account of the CAFO, while properties within one-tenth of 
a mile of a CAFO decreased in value by as much as 88%.96 
Another study suggests that properties downwind from and clos-
est to CAFOs suffer the largest decreases in value.97 The size 
and type of CAFO can also affect the degree to which nearby 
properties decrease in value.98 A decrease in property value hurts 
the property owner most directly, but this harm infects the entire 
local economy when property tax rates plummet along with 
property values.99
III. law as an Instrument oF oPPressIon: 
ProPPIng uP caFos
While CAFOs devastate the environment and public health, 
they are severely under-regulated at the federal level.100 And 
at the state level, so-called “right-to-farm” and “ag-gag” laws 
in North Carolina shield CAFO operators from nuisance suits 
and whistleblowers, while North Carolina purports to regulate 
CAFOs with laws that largely fail to protect communities.101 
Thus, the law has parted like the Red Sea to make way for 
CAFOs and all the misery that they rain down on vulnerable 
communities.
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a. Devil in the DetailS: the enforcement gap in 
feDeral environmental law
American environmentalism was born in the 1960s. 
Following the passage of the Clean Air Act (CAA)102 in 1963 
and the Clean Water Act (CWA)103 in 1972, landmark environ-
mental protection laws began sprouting up through the decades. 
Still, because “farms are virtually unregulated by the expansive 
body of environmental law that has developed in the United 
States . . . .”104 environmental injustice abounds in vulnerable 
communities.
1. The Clean WaTer aCT
The Clean Water Act (CWA) declares in § 101(a) that it 
aims to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation’s waters” and achieve “water 
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of 
fish, shellfish, and wildlife” by establishing a framework for 
federal regulation of surface waters quality standards and pollu-
tion discharges into the navigable waters of the United States.105 
To accomplish this goal, the CWA “authorizes the regulation 
and enforcement of requirements that govern waste discharges 
into U.S. waters.”106 Section 402 of the CWA107 establishes the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
which administers the effluent (waste) limitations established in 
§ 301108 and prohibits the discharge of pollution109 from point 
sources110 into navigable waters of the United States without a 
permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the 
state.111
Some CAFOs are large enough to qualify as regulated point 
sources under the CAFO Rule.112 Those CAFOs must fulfill 
permit and annual report requirements.113 Regulated CAFOs are 
also responsible for creating a plan for handling waste.114
But the CWA still fails to prevent CAFOs from polluting 
water. First, fewer than 10% of all CAFOs are large enough to 
qualify as a regulated point source under the CAFO Rule.115 
Second, the stormwater exception swallows the CAFO Rule. 
“Agricultural return flows and stormwater discharge are con-
sidered non-point sources and therefore do not require NPDES 
permits to discharge pollutants through these avenues. This 
exception to the Clean Water Act extends so far as to include 
rainwater that contacts stored manure and subsequently flows 
into navigable waters.”116 Thus, the CWA fails to regulate runoff 
or to provide incentives to CAFO owners and operators to try 
to avoid catastrophes during hurricanes and floods.117 Third, 
punishing case law has greatly weakened the CAFO Rule, con-
tributing to the low number of CAFOs that are actually required 
to obtain a NPDES permit.118 Fourth, noncompliance is rampant 
and enforcement is dismal119—in part due to a lack of data on 
existing CAFOs.120 Fifth, the CWA does not directly regulate 
groundwater.121
2. The Clean air aCT
The Clean Air Act (CAA) “regulates ‘criteria-pollutants’ 
that deteriorate ambient air quality, hazardous air pollutants, 
and emissions from certain specific sources of air pollution.”122 
The EPA is authorized to “set mobile source limits, ambient air 
quality standards, hazardous air pollutant emission standards, 
[and] standards for new pollution sources. . . .”123 The EPA 
is also authorized “to identify areas that do not attain federal 
ambient air quality standards set under the act . . . and phase out 
substances that deplete the Earth’s stratospheric ozone layer.”124 
The goal of the CAA is to prevent ambient air emissions from 
harming the environment and public health.125
Under the CAA, the EPA must set minimum national stan-
dards for air quality, or National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS), but the states are primarily responsible for ensuring 
compliance with NAAQS.126 Areas that are struggling to meet 
NAAQS, called “nonattainment areas,” must implement special 
measures to control air pollution.127 The CAA also creates a 
comprehensive permit system that applies to major sources of 
air pollution, which are those sources emitting more than 100 
tons of regulated pollutants each year.128
The CAA applies to CAFOs in theory.129 But in reality, the 
CAA still fails to prevent CAFOs from polluting the air. First, 
“air emissions from farms typically do not exceed thresholds 
specified in the Clean Air Act . . . and thus generally escape most 
CAA regulatory programs.”130 Second, regulators at both the 
federal and state levels have been lax in enforcing the CAA (and 
other environmental laws) against CAFOs. Instead, regulators 
“traditionally focused most effort on controlling the largest and 
most visible sources of pollution to the water, air, and land—
factories, waste treatment plants, motor vehicles—rather than 
smaller and more dispersed sources such as farms.”131 Third, 
the CAA Mandatory Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Rule132 
addresses manure management systems, but Congress barred the 
EPA from using funds to implement mandatory GHG reporting 
for manure management facilities.133 Fourth, there is a dearth 
of data.134 The CAA “requires accurate measurement of emis-
sions to determine whether [CAFOs] emit regulated pollutants 
in quantities that exceed specified thresholds.”135
Citing a need for such data, the EPA entered into an Air 
Compliance Agreement136 with CAFO owners and operators.137 
“Early in 2002, representatives of agriculture industry groups—
especially pork and egg producers—approached EPA officials 
with a proposal to negotiate a voluntary agreement that would 
produce air quality monitoring data on emissions from animal 
feedlot operations.”138 In exchange for industry cooperation, 
the EPA agreed to provide immunity for past and ongoing viola-
tions of the CAA to all participating CAFOs. “EPA granted cov-
enants not to sue and released participants from EPA liability 
for failing to comply with certain provisions of the CAA.”139 
Critics of the agreement include environmental groups and state 
and local air quality officials, who were not included in the 
negotiation process.140
More than 13,900 operations across forty-two states 
signed up to participate in the agreement, including 1,856 pig 
operations.141 After the EPA released the data gathered under the 
agreement in 2011, an Environmental Integrity Project analysis 
showed that “measured levels of several pollutants—particles, 
ammonia, and hydrogen sulfide—exceeded CAA health-based 
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standards, worker protection standards, and federal emis-
sion reporting limits at some of the study sites.”142 The EPA’s 
methodologies have come under fire, however, since the study 
failed to include turkey operations, beef cattle operations, or 
sprayfields, and collected data from a very small number of 
operations.143 Years later, after granting thousands of CAFOs 
immunity, the EPA still has not taken steps to use the data col-
lected to better regulate CAFOs under the CAA. This holding 
pattern, and the enforcement gap more broadly across federal 
law, is likely the result of the politically powerful farm lobby 
exerting its influence.144
b. inDuStry above people: north carolina law
North Carolina law serves CAFO owners and operators in 
three main ways. First, the state has eviscerated nuisance as a 
cause of action under its so-called “Right-to-Farm” law. Second, 
the state has passed an “ag-gag” law intended to prevent the 
public from discovering the misconduct and illegal actions of 
CAFO owner and operators. Third, the state has lax environ-
mental regulations of CAFOs.
1. insulT To injury: The norTh Carolina “righT-To-
Farm” laW
Property owners have been suing pig farmers for centuries. 
In William Aldred’s Case,145 “the Court of the King’s Bench rec-
ognized [a]n action on the case lies for erecting a hogstye so near 
the house of the plaintiff that the air thereof was corrupted.”146 
Common law nuisance theories remain an essential tool for U.S. 
property owners who seek to protect their right to enjoy their 
property, even after the development of complex environmental 
laws.147 But in North Carolina, nuisance suits against CAFOs 
are now an option extinguished and community members are 
left without legal remedy.
North Carolina first enacted its so-called “right-to-farm” 
(RTF) law148 in 1979.149 That early version of the law created 
an affirmative “coming to the nuisance” defense for preexist-
ing CAFO owners and operators when they faced suits from 
community members who purchased property in the CAFO-
occupied community.150 The rationale behind these laws was 
that the CAFO was there first.151
In 2013, North Carolina’s RTF law became a “right-to-
commit-nuisance” law (RTCN).152 Now, a CAFO “may raise an 
affirmative defense to liability in a nuisance action regardless of 
whether it had undergone a change in ownership, size, or type 
of product produced. As a result, agricultural operations may be 
able to benefit from these protections regardless of whether the 
facility actually preceded its neighboring landowners.”153 The 
RTCN amendments followed close on the heels of lawsuits filed 
by hundreds of community members against Murphy-Brown, 
LLC154—a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, Inc.—for the opera-
tion of pig CAFOs in eastern North Carolina, and they will fur-
ther disempower community members to fight the destruction of 
their homes and neighborhoods.155
The North Carolina legislature recently pushed through yet 
another RTCN bill, overriding Democratic Governor Cooper’s 
veto.156 Republican State Representative Jimmy Dixon, whose 
campaign finance records reveal that he has accepted $115,000 
from the pork industry, sponsored House Bill 467.157 He char-
acterized the bill as “protecting ‘red-blooded, hard-working’ 
American farmers.”158 Republican State Senator Brent Jackson 
sponsored the Senate companion bill, and his campaign finance 
records reveal that he has accepted more than $130,000 from 
the pork industry.159 Previous North Carolina law provided that 
the jury would determine the amount of compensatory damages 
in nuisance cases.160 But now, the law “will essentially cap 
the damages property owners can collect in nuisance lawsuits 
at the fair market value of their property, which critics point 
out is often made lower by the presence of those commercial 
farms.”161 Thus, this bill severely limits any damages that a 
community member might win against a CAFO owner or opera-
tor, which in turn makes challenging CAFOs via nuisance law a 
less appealing option.162
2. gagging WhisTlebloWers: The norTh Carolina 
“ag-gag laW”
Ag-gag163 laws are designed to shield CAFOs from whistle-
blowers and reporters who seek to collect evidence of wrong-
doing. “Ag-Gag bills were designed to place restraints on free 
speech by making it a crime to take photos or video on a factory 
farm without the written permission of the owner.”164 These 
laws are harmful to the public because they thwart undercover 
investigations that reveal dangerous and abhorrent activity such 
as animal abuse, environmental crimes, and food safety risks 
that could sicken millions.165 Without the investigations that 
ag-gag laws seek to prevent, the public may not discover such 
information until the damage is already done.
Nonetheless, ag-gag legislation is sweeping the nation.166 
On January 1, 2016, North Carolina’s ag-gag law167 went into 
effect.168 This law is even broader than most ag-gag laws:
The law provides for a civil cause of action against 
whistleblowers who seek to inform the public about 
matters of public concern in their workplace. This 
law will deter whistleblowers in facilities like nursing 
homes, hospitals, day cares, schools, and animal agri-
culture from reporting concerning or illegal conduct.169
Organizations, journalists, and employees who conduct 
undercover investigations of CAFOs and release evidence 
of wrongdoing to the public or to the press will be liable and 
could face civil suit and damages.170 This law shrouds CAFOs 
in secrecy, making it more difficult for community members to 
discover any wrongdoing that CAFO owners and operators are 
committing in their backyards.171
3. norTh Carolina regulaTions: indusTry over PeoPle
Despite . . . documented environmental and human 
health harms from CAFO pollution, the industry and 
its allies have been able to emasculate government pro-
tection of its citizens at every level. Local governments 
have been stripped of control in many communities, 
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preventing them from passing zoning or public health 
ordinances to address CAFO pollution. State and fed-
eral permitting and enforcement activity is nonexistent 
or weak . . . .172
In the 1980s, a pig farmer turned state senator named 
Wendell Murphy, set out to vertically integrate pig farming 
in North Carolina.173 He aimed to pass state laws that would 
incubate the pig CAFO industry and stymie environmental 
regulation.174
In 1986, Murphy helped pass a bill that eliminated the 
sales tax on hog and poultry houses; in 1987, the sales 
tax was waived on any equipment related to the CAFO 
industry. In 1991, county managers from four of the 
state’s largest hog counties considered imposing regula-
tions on the hog industry. Instead, Murphy cosponsored 
a bill that prohibited them from passing such zoning 
ordinances. When the bill passed, CAFO facilities were 
protected like traditional family farms.175 
Through his legislation, Murphy’s vision of vertical integra-
tion came to pass: though there were 22,000 pig farmers rais-
ing two million pigs in North Carolina thirty years ago, today 
there are only 2,300 farmers raising nine million pigs.176 Like 
Murphy’s legislation, this trajectory began in the 1980s when 
“[t]he number of small, diversified farms fell precipitously. Most 
of the farms that survived did so by going big—raising thou-
sands of animals that spend their entire lives inside barns.”177 
WH Group, a Chinese corporation that bought out Smithfield 
Foods in 2013, is now the dominant corporation behind pig 
CAFOs in North Carolina.178
The North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) regulates the state’s Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), 
which are defined such that they include pig operations with 
(1) at least 250 pigs and (2) a liquid animal waste management 
system.179 DEQ has also been responsible for “establish[ing] 
siting requirements for application setbacks from property 
boundaries and perennial streams since 1992.”180 Almost all 
permitted pig CAFOs are subject to the regulations of the North 
Carolina Swine Waste Management System General Permit 
(General Permit), which contains requirements regarding opera-
tion and maintenance, monitoring and reporting, inspections, 
performance standards, general conditions, and penalties.181 The 
substance of the General Permit comes up for revision every five 
years, and was renewed in 2014 “following extensive public 
involvement.”182
DEQ only agreed to regulate CAFOs after the disastrous 
lagoon breach of 1995, which dumped more than 20 million 
gallons of waste into the New River.183 In 1997, North Carolina 
instituted a moratorium on new and expanded pig CAFOs as 
a result of the disaster.184 This moratorium became permanent 
in 2007 with regard to CAFOs using or proposing to use the 
lagoon and sprayfield waste management system.185 The exist-
ing CAFOs, however, are still allowed to utilize this system 
under the General Permit.186 DEQ insists that the lagoon and 
sprayfield waste system is working because CAFO operators are 
limited in the amount of waste they can apply to sprayfields at 
once. “All waste must be applied at no greater than agronomic 
rates—an amount that can be used productively by the crops 
planted.”187 But in January 2015, researchers found that high 
levels of fecal bacteria in local waterways are linked to CAFOs, 
and state officials have only dismissed community members’ 
concerns.188 DEQ visits CAFOs only once each year, and the 
agency has never revoked a permit or shut down a farm.189
IV. the root oF all eVIl: money as the 
source oF the enForcement gaP and law  
as an Instrument oF oPPressIon
a. Special intereStS
Section III presented the ways in which the law is failing 
to protect CAFO-occupied communities and even aids in their 
oppression. Big Ag has engineered this failure by maintaining 
a stranglehold on the American political process in two ways. 
First, Big Ag exploits the image of the wholesome farming 
family, almost always portrayed as white, that many Americans 
admire.190 By portraying industrial farms as the small family 
farms of yore, the Big Ag lobby successfully controls public and 
political opinion. Second, Big Ag spends tremendous amounts 
of money influencing members of Congress.
The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), rated by 
Fortune magazine as one of the top twenty-five most powerful 
special interest groups in the United States, is a prime example 
of how Big Ag lobbying groups control the political process.191 
“The [AFBF] promotes the interests of farm corporations 
in Washington D.C., and in state capitals. For decades, they 
have spent millions fighting environmental regulations of all 
kinds.”192 And because Big Ag has convinced the country that 
industrial farms are small family farms, it is all too easy to char-
acterize environmental regulations as the big boot of the Federal 
Government standing on the little guy’s throat. Ron Prestage, 
President of the National Pork Producers Council, recently said 
of the proposed Clean Water Rule: “[T]his regulation isn’t about 
clean water. This massive land grab is about federal control of 
private property, growing the size of government and allowing 
activists to extort and micromanage all kinds of farming and 
business activities.”193
And then there is money. “[Q]uestions about whether 
environmental laws should apply to CAFOs continue to give 
rise to controversy in Congress and the states, and the $297 bil-
lion and growing agricultural industry maintains an extensive 
bench of lobbyists to take advantage of that controversy.”194 
Between 2005 and 2010, Big Ag spent $126.9 million lobby-
ing Congress and federal regulatory agencies.195 AFBF alone 
spent $33.6 million and employed fifty lobbyists who spent 
their time fighting the Clean Water Act and other rules affect-
ing CAFO pollution.196 In 2016, Big Ag spent $127,592,310 
lobbying.197 Big Ag directed the majority of that money to 
Republican politicians, including $2,702,601 to then-Repub-
lican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump.198 Finally, Big 
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Ag receives an average of $38.4 billion in farm subsidies (also 
known as “corporate welfare”) per year.199
b. north carolina: “captureD by the inDuStry”200
North Carolina makes no secret of its allegiance to Big Ag. 
In 2015, then-Governor Pat McCrory attended a rally held by the 
pork industry. “McCrory told those at the industry rally,” which 
was held to oppose lawsuits over the industry’s environmental 
practices, that the “state government would fight for them.”201 A 
Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative series on the North Carolina 
pork industry revealed that the industry and the government 
have been close since the beginning:
In a seven-month investigation, The N&O found that 
state agencies aid the expansion of pork production but 
are slow to act on a growing range of problems result-
ing from that increase. The industry has won laws and 
policies promoting its rapid growth in North Carolina. 
It also has profited from a network of formal and infor-
mal alliances with powerful people in government.202
One explanation for this closeness is that when the North 
Carolina tobacco industry went into decline in the 1980s, the 
burgeoning pork industry filled the void.203 But whatever rea-
son, one thing is clear: North Carolina is prioritizing industry 
over community—especially communities of color.
V. north carolIna: FIghtIng back and 
grassroots growth
Poor people, and people of color especially, continue 
to suffer from the horrible conditions brought on by 
the industrial hog industry . . . . People just can’t 
ignore this.204
Members of CAFO-occupied communities have pleaded 
with North Carolina government officials for years. “[C]ommu-
nities have repeatedly asked [DEQ] for stronger protections. 
Citizens have tried to reach a resolution with government offi-
cials that is agreeable to neighbors, regulators, and the industry. 
Some have brought civil complaints for nuisance and trespass 
against individual facilities.”205 Advocacy organizations, includ-
ing North Carolina Riverkeepers, Waterkeepers Alliance, North 
Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), and Rural 
Empowerment Association for Community Help (REACH), 
have all joined in the fight to take back these communities from 
CAFO occupation.206 But alas, “over the decades, complaints 
have largely fallen on deaf ears.”207
a. community organizing anD information 
gathering
Community members rallied together and armed themselves 
with information. Devon Hall, who was one such community 
member, co-founded REACH in 2002 and began collaborat-
ing with Professor Steve Wing, a public health professor at the 
University of North Carolina.208 Hall and Wing (the researchers) 
worked alongside community members to gather valuable data 
for their fight against CAFOs.209
In the Duplin Health Awareness Project,210 the first of ten 
such studies, the researchers set up equipment in neighborhoods 
within a mile of CAFOs to monitor the air quality for toxins and 
PM.211 Then, the researchers instructed community members to 
sit outdoors and note odor intensity and their own daily stress 
levels.212 At the same time, the community members tracked 
their own blood pressure and lung function with medical equip-
ment.213 They recorded all of the data they collected about their 
surroundings, health, and well-being.214 The researchers and the 
community members were able to develop data proving what 
the community members already knew from experience: there 
are “correlations between hog waste and asthma and other respi-
ratory problems, such as bronchitis, along with compromised 
immune systems and increased stress and anxiety.”215
REACH took further action to monitor air and water and 
to organize the community. First, the organization worked with 
Waterkeeper Alliance, who deployed Riverkeepers to take water 
samples from area waterways.216 Additionally, the collaborators 
created maps of the CAFOs and lagoons and patrolled the com-
munity to record violations of the General Permit, such as when 
CAFO operators spray manure on the sprayfields before or dur-
ing a storm.217 Finally, REACH went door-to-door in communi-
ties to distribute fact sheets and unite neighbors. “‘We told them, 
this is how many pigs live around you, and this is who’s mak-
ing the money. We got good at mobilizing the community.’”218 
Ultimately, the community utilized the information and data 
they collected to try to prevent DEQ from renewing the General 
Permit in 2014.219 While they did not succeed in preventing 
the renewal, their efforts did come to fruition in 2007 when the 
North Carolina legislature made the moratorium on new lagoon 
and sprayfield CAFOs permanent.220
But community mobilization and investigative efforts are 
not without risk. CAFO operators harassed water samplers.221 
Community members reported that CAFO operators subjected 
community members who spoke out to several intimidation 
tactics, “including sustained tailgating, yelling, threats of gun 
and other physical violence, and driving back in forth in front 
of their houses.”222 When community members called DEQ 
to report illegal spraying during or before a storm, they were 
rewarded with calls from disgruntled CAFO operators after DEQ 
informed them of the complaint.223 Such complaints are confi-
dential—but nonetheless, DEQ regulators sometimes choose to 
expose those who make them.224 In the most egregious incident 
of harassment, a CAFO operator entered “the home of an elderly 
African American woman and sh[ook] the chair she sat in while 
threatening her and her family with physical violence if they 
continued to complain about the odors and spray.”225
b. civil rightS complaint
In March 2014, DEQ ignored community pleas and renewed 
the General Permit that allowed CAFOs to continue using 
lagoons and sprayfields as waste management.226 This was the 
last straw for North Carolina activists. “‘We’ve been asking the 
state and our representatives for years to do something differ-
ent about how this industry operates in the state,’ says NCEJN’s 
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Muhammad. ‘It was an insult to the community and to the people 
of the state of North Carolina to renew those permits.’”227
In September 2014, Earthjustice and the University of North 
Carolina Center for Civil Rights, representing Waterkeeper 
Alliance, NCEJN, and REACH (Citizens), filed a complaint 
(“Complaint”)228 in the EPA External Civil Rights Compliance 
Office (ECRCO) (formerly the Office of Civil Rights) under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)229 and its 
implementing regulations.230 Under Title VI, state regulatory 
programs that receive federal funding may not operate in such 
a way that disproportionately impacts communities of color in 
a negative way.231 In their Complaint, the groups allege that 
“the State’s lax regulation of hog-waste disposal discriminates 
against minority communities in eastern North Carolina, and 
that its [Department of Environmental Quality’s] recent permit 
allowing thousands of hog facilities to function without adequate 
waste-disposal controls violates federal law.”232
In February 2015, ECRCO began investigating DEQ on 
the basis of the Complaint.233 In March, the Citizens and DEQ 
agreed to enter into alternative dispute resolution, funded by 
the EPA.234 As the January 2016 mediation date approached, 
the National Pork Council and the North Carolina Pork Council 
moved to intervene—a troubling development for the Citizens, 
since the negotiations were confidential.235 The Citizens objected 
to industry involvement in the mediation:
On behalf of our clients, who were adamant that the 
Pork Council should not be at the table—this was 
not about them, it was about DEQ’s responsibility to 
protect the environment and health and safety of the 
people of North Carolina—we said no, there’s no place 
for you here.236
Nonetheless, the National Pork Council and the North 
Carolina Pork Council appeared at the session, and DEQ made 
it clear that the agency supported their presence during nego-
tiations.237 Earthjustice attorney Marianne Lado declined to 
“speculate on whether DEQ told the pork councils about the 
mediation, but added that the agency ‘tried to normalize the 
problem and suggest that it was acceptable for pork councils to 
be there. [DEQ] didn’t act surprised that they were there.’”238 
The Citizens were concerned about exposing the identities of 
the community representatives present at the meeting, due to 
the pork industry’s long history of intimidating residents.239 The 
Citizens withdrew from mediation in March 2016 and the nego-
tiations broke down.240
In May 2016, ECRCO reinstated its DEQ investiga-
tion.241 The Citizens filed an additional complaint (“Second 
Complaint”)242 against DEQ in July, alleging that the agency 
“engaged in and failed to protect [the Citizens] from intimida-
tion, which is prohibited by Title VI and EPA regulations, 40 
C.F.R. § 7.100.”243 The Second Complaint discussed the long 
history of the pork industry using intimidation tactics against 
residents of eastern North Carolina.244 In August, ECRCO 
agreed to investigate DEQ based on the Second Complaint.245 
DEQ requested that the original Complaint be dismissed, but 
ECRCO declined to do so.246 In October, twenty community 
representatives drove to Washington, D.C., to share their story 
with EPA and members of Congress.247 A month later, officials 
from ECRCO toured the area and listened to residents with 
Senator Cory Booker, a member of the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee.248
Finally, in January of 2017, ECRCO took an “unprecedented 
step”249 and sent an official Letter of Concern to DEQ.250 In the 
letter, ECRCO expressed “deep concern about the possibility that 
African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have been 
subjected to discrimination as the result of NC DEQ’s opera-
tion of the Swine Waste General Permit program, including the 
2014 renewal of the Swine Waste General Permit.”251 ECRCO 
also expressed “grave concerns about these reports indicating a 
potential hostile and intimidating environment for anyone seeking 
to provide relevant information to NC DEQ or EPA.”252 ECRCO 
made several recommendations to DEQ:
• Assess the Swine Waste General Permit to determine how 
it should be changed to substantially reduce impacts on 
nearby residents. The EPA also asked for a timeline.
• Assess current regulations on industrialized hog farms 
and determined what could be changed. If the DEQ 
claims it doesn’t have the authority to change a rule, it 
needs to show evidence of the impediment.
• Evaluate risk management options, such as covering the 
lagoons, not using dead boxes [a holding pen for hog car-
casses] and not spraying on the weekends.
• Assess current swine waste technologies and what could 
be adopted.
• Conduct an internal evaluation of DEQ’s enforcement 
and compliance of industrialized hog farms. If corrective 
measures are needed, deliver a timetable to do so.
• Evaluate its non-discrimination program if its [sic] in 
place, using a federal checklist. If the program hasn’t 
been established, DEQ is to correct the deficiencies.253
While the Letter of Concern is not the firm decision that 
community members had hoped to receive, they are pleased 
that people are taking notice of the community’s plight.254 And 
there is reason to remain hopeful: “the agency’s pointed, harsh 
letter and its ongoing investigation—plus a new administration 
at DEQ—could tip the scales toward environmental justice.”255
c. overcoming in a time of aggreSSive regreSSion
In November 2016, Donald J. Trump was declared the vic-
tor of the 2016 United States Presidential Election.256 At the 
same time, both houses of Congress remained under Republican 
domination.257 As a result, both the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the Federal Government now seek to greatly reduce 
or eliminate the EPA, and the President’s budget proposal 
included an External Civil Rights Compliance Office reduc-
tion of $268,000 and eleven full-time employees.258 The EPA 
has issued a plan to lay off 25% of its employees and eliminate 
fifty-six programs.259 Thus, it may be necessary for communities 
seeking to protect themselves from CAFOs to focus on state law 
in the foreseeable future.
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North Carolina is an ideal state for such action. The com-
munity has succeeded in generating tremendous publicity, which 
will make it more difficult for state legislators and DEQ to con-
tinue to ignore their pleas. Roy Cooper, a Democrat and former 
Attorney General of North Carolina, unseated Pat McCrory in 
the state’s 2016 gubernatorial race.260 This change may give 
community members the toe-hold they need to take back their 
state from Big Ag, even if EPA fails them going forward.
There are several ways community members might move 
forward in this fight at the state-level. First, they may campaign 
to repeal the so-called “right-to-farm” law and the ag-gag 
law. Second, they may continue to exert pressure on DEQ to 
update the General Permit and ban lagoon and sprayfield waste 
management systems. In the (weaker) alternative, they may 
campaign for lagoons to be covered and for sprayfields to be 
rigorously inspected to avoid runoff. Third, they may leverage 
the EPA Letter of Concern to DEQ and petition DEQ to adopt 
EPA’s recommendations. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
the communities may campaign to replace the Republican mem-
bers of the North Carolina legislature with representatives who 
would aid them in their fight against CAFOs.
The fourth objective is likely to be difficult at present, 
however, as there is evidence that the Republican legislature 
suppresses the votes of North Carolinians of color261 and gerry-
manders districts along racial lines.262 Fortunately, lawsuits have 
challenged both of these barriers to the full participation and 
representation of marginalized North Carolina communities.263 
With the help of the federal courts, the communities may be able 
to change the makeup of their legislature and ensure that their 
representatives actually represent them and not Big Ag.
VI. conclusIon
CAFOs are major polluters that exploit and endanger the 
vulnerable communities they occupy. Therefore, they must be 
treated as such at both the federal and state levels. CAFOs should 
be strictly regulated as major polluters and should be subject to 
strict siting regulations that protect vulnerable communities like 
those of the North Carolina Coastal Plain.
To break down the political barriers that prevent these 
essential regulations from coming to fruition, it is necessary to 
attack the corrupting influence of corporate money in politics. 
So long as the farm lobby can buy politicians to guard and pro-
mote the interests of Big Ag, including the corporate welfare the 
industry siphons from taxpayers in the form of subsidies, it will 
be impossible to make meaningful progress in this arena.
Likewise, it is necessary to challenge and change the nar-
rative that CAFOs are family farms with happy pigs dotting 
their pastureland. This lie, which depends upon the American 
tradition of exalting the white, rugged farmer of yesteryear, has 
proven wildly successful and forms the foundation of the CAFO 
house of cards. The first step in challenging and changing this 
narrative is to unmask CAFOs and Big Ag. Their true faces are 
those of massive industry, not small business. Once unmasked, 
it will become politically feasible to regulate this industry 
appropriately. Such regulation has the potential to ensure that the 
industry’s access to our economic infrastructure and society is a 
privilege that will not be to the detriment of the most vulnerable 
among us, including non-human animals.
In this time of great political turmoil, the North Carolina 
communities have modeled a path forward: grassroots organi-
zation and mobilization. By forging connections among neigh-
bors, researchers, advocacy organizations, and public interest 
law firms, the communities created a formidable coalition of 
justice-minded people. While it may be that EPA is of little 
help going forward, these communities can continue to fight 
CAFOs at the state level. With Mr. Cooper in the Governor’s 
Mansion, they just may be able to get enough traction to make 
change in their state.
More broadly, Americans must recognize and resist 
the vast destruction that CAFOs cause. CAFOs fuel climate 
change, wantonly torture sentient non-human animals, and 
harm human health. Big Ag manipulates our political system 
and exploits taxpayers for tremendous profit. And, as the case of 
North Carolina demonstrates, CAFOs are cogs in the machine 
that has systematically oppressed communities of color for 
centuries. While comprehensive CAFO regulation (or, ideally, 
elimination) will increase the cost of animal products at the 
checkout counter, the status quo is a cost that communities of 
color cannot continue to bear. 
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from Bob Meadow & Joshua Ulibarri, Lake Research Partners, to Interested 
Parties, Broiler Chicken—Online Survey Public Memo 1 (Apr. 2017), https://
www.aspca.org/sites/default/files/publicmemo.aspca_.broilerchicken2013.pdf 
(“Once consumers learned more about these conditions, concern about chicken 
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